Can Seamen Claim Unfair Dismissal Before The Industrial Tribunal?

Introduction

In a recent preliminary decision number 3174 decided on 22 April 2026, the Industrial Tribunal was faced with an unfair dismissal claim. This decision provided the Tribunal with an opportunity to consolidate the distinction between the employment law framework under the Employment and Industrial Relations Act (‘EIRA’), Chapter 452 of the Laws of Malta, and the specialised regime governing maritime workers under the Merchant Shipping Act, Chapter 234 of the Laws of Malta.

Facts of the Case

The claimant, employed under a ‘Seafarer Employment Agreement’, instituted proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal alleging that he had been unfairly dismissed by the respondent company. The latter raised a preliminary plea, arguing that the claimant qualified as a seaman under the Merchant Shipping Act and as a result, by virtue of Article 39 EIRA, the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the claim.

In response, the claimant argued that his employment relationship should not be assessed solely by reference to the title or form of the agreement. He maintained that the contract had been concluded directly with the company rather than with the ship’s master and that the practical realities of the relationship resembled an ordinary employment relationship. The claimant further argued that the circumstances of his dismissal were indicative of an unfair dismissal falling within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal.

Tribunal Decision

Before entering into the merits of the case, the Tribunal assessed whether it enjoyed jurisdiction. It referred to Article 36 EIRA governing termination of employment, including unfair dismissal. It also referred to Article 39 EIRA, which expressly excludes seamen under the Merchant Shipping Act from the scope of Article 36. Article 39 further provides that where a conflict arises between the Merchant Shipping Act and EIRA, the former shall prevail.

The decisive issue was therefore whether the claimant fell within the statutory definition of a seaman under the Merchant Shipping Act:

“every person (except masters, pilots and apprentices) employed or engaged in any capacity on board a ship”

The Tribunal concluded that the claimant fell within this definition. Since seamen are expressly excluded from the application of Article 36 EIRA, it ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to hear and determine the case.

Key Takeaway

The Tribunal’s decision therefore confirms that the statutory classification of a seaman is decisive in determining jurisdiction in cases of unfair dismissal and attempts to re-characterise a seaman’s engagement as an ordinary employment relationship will not, in themselves, overcome the clear statutory exclusion in Article 39 EIRA.

The Legal Position of Seamen vs Ship Masters

The decision is consistent with the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in Albert Gyorgy v Crystal River Cruises Manning Ltd decided on 15 September 2021. This case also illustrates the important distinction between seamen and ship masters in the context of unfair dismissal, with each category being subject to a different legal regime.

In this case, the Court of Appeal overturned an earlier Industrial Tribunal decision which held that the appellant’s role as Chief Engineer was akin to that of a ship master. The latter is defined as having command or charge over a ship. Ship masters are not only defined separately from seamen but are also expressly excluded from the definition of seamen. As a result of this exclusion, the Tribunal concluded that Article 39 EIRA did not apply and the appellant could therefore pursue an unfair dismissal claim under EIRA.

The Court of Appeal rejected this interpretation and held that the appellant fell within the definition of a seaman for the purposes of the Merchant Shipping Act. Consequently, the ordinary courts, and not the Industrial Tribunal, were competent to determine the unfair dismissal claim.

Does this Mean that Seamen are Not Protected?

Although seamen are excluded from the statutory unfair dismissal regime under EIRA, their employment contract remains regulated under the Merchant Shipping Act which also affords several safeguards.

One notable example is found in Article 50 of Chapter 234, which establishes a system of special maritime privileges. These privileges constitute preferred claims over the vessel and its proceeds and rank ahead of most other debts. In particular, Article 50(h) grants a special maritime privilege over wages and other sums due to the master, officers and crew for their employment on the vessel. This privilege also extends to repatriation costs and social insurance contributions payable on their behalf.

Whilst these maritime privileges provide protection against the non-payment of wages and other employment-related sums, they do not bring seamen within the statutory unfair dismissal framework established by EIRA.

Conclusion

This decision provides greater legal certainty for maritime employers, crew management companies and seamen regarding the appropriate forum for unfair dismissal disputes arising at sea. Moreover, it reinforces the distinction between the employment regime established under EIRA and the specialised framework under the Merchant Shipping Act. The latter regulates seamen’s contracts of employment, including their termination.

Dr Christine Calleja successfully represented the respondent company in the proceedings before the Industrial Tribunal.